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In models with external economies, there are often two or more long run
equilibria.Which equilibrium is chosen? Much of the literature presumes that
"history" sets initial conditions which determine the outcome, but an
alternative view stresses the role of "expectations", i.e. of self.fulfilling
prophecy. This paper uses a simple trade model with both external economies
and adjustment costs to show how the parameters of the economy determine the





Cambridge, HA 02139In recent years there has been increasing interest in economic models in
which there are positive external economies in production; these models have
been seen as a way to formulate rigorously a number of heterodox challenges to
standard economic doctrine. Ethier (1982a,1982b) has provided a new,
streamlined exposition of Graham's (1923) argument that external economies may
make the pattern of international trade arbitrary and the gains from trade
ambiguous, and has also shown that monopolistic competition in intermediate
goods may lead to de facto external economies in production of final goods.
Romer (1986m,1986b) has shown that external economies may remove the
traditional distinction between factor accumulation and technical change as
sources of growth, and has also shown that an Ethier-like formulation can
rationalize Allyn Young's (1928) vision of cumulative growth driven by
increasing returns. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) ha\re shown how
market-size effects can in effect create external economies among firms
investing in industrialization, and have used this insight to offer a rigorous
formulation of Rosenstein-Rodan's (1943) "Big Push" theory of economic
development. In my own work (1981,1987) I have used external economies to
formulate an "uneven development" model in which the division of the acrid
into rich and poor nations takes place endogenously, and a model in tchich a
variety of heterodox views are justified by m framework in which patterns of
specialization generated by historical accident get "locked in" through
learning effects.
1A key element in many of these models is the possibility of meaningful
multiple equilibria in the presence of external economies. The point ia
obvious: when there are external economies, it will often happen that the
return to committing resources to some activity is higher, the greater the
resources committed. Thus in Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) ,thereturn
to investment is higher the rate of investment; in Krugman (1987) the rate of
learning in a sector is larger the larger the sector; and so on. In the
emerging literature on increasing returns and externalitiea, multiple
equilibria are not a nuisance but a central part of the story.
Once one has multiple equilibria, however, there is an obvioua question:
which equilibrium actually gets established? Although few have emphasized thia
point, there is a broad division into two camps in both the traditional
literature and the recent models on this question. On one side is the belief
that the choice among multiple equilibria is essentially resolved by hiatory:
that past events set the preconditions that drive the economy to one or
another steady state. In the traditional literature thia view is the
preponderant one; indeed, as I will emphasize later there is a atrong
tradition arguing that history matters precisely because of increaalng
returns. On the other side, however, is the view that the key determinant of
choice of equilibrium is expectations: that there is a decisive element of
self-fulfilling prophec3t.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to point out the importance of the
2history vs. expectations distinction, and to shed light on the issue by
presenting an illustrative model in which the relative importance of the past
and the expected future can be seen to depend on objective parameters of the
economy. The model also has some technically inte'resting features, showing
somewhat surprisingly that a role for self-fulfilling prohecies emerges when
the deterministic dynamic system would exhibit oscillatory behavior. While the
model developed here is very simple and fairly special, I hope that its
properties will turn out to be useful guides to studying more elaborate and
realistic models in the future.
1. History exoectations in filiterature
The idea of external economies goes back to Marshall, and it was Marshall
who formulated the concept of backward-looking dynamics that underlies moat
informal and some formal treatments of the determination of long-run
equilibrium with externalities. In Marshall's dynamics, factors of production
shift gradually toward those activities in which they earn the higheat current
rate of return. If there are several possible equilibria in which factor
returns would be equalized across activities, then Marshallian dynamics tell
us that the outcome depends on the initial conditions: histocy, os well as
tastes, technology, and factor endowments, matters.
The idea that the main effect of multiple equilibria is to give a crucial
3role to history appears in many of the classic arguments for including
increasing returns and external economies in economic analysis. Myrdal (1957),
fot example, saw as the key failing of standard analysis its neglect of
"circular causation", whereby divergences in initial conditions tend to grow
over time. Kaldor (1972), in denouncing the "irrelevance of equilibriua
economics", argued that the ahistorical nature of standard economic models
arises precisely from their neglect of increasing returns. David (1985), in
his analysis of how technologies get locked in by external econoaiea,
emphasized the role of historical accident in determining long run outooaos.
The dynamic process by which hiatory comes to determine the choice of
equilibrium is only implicit in this traditional literature. There is,
however, also a formal literature in which dynamics are formulated in such a
way that history is decisive. In the fairly extensive literature on trade with
external economies, of which Ethier (l982a) and Panagariya (1986) are notable
recent examples, there is usually a stability analysis in which Marshallian
dynamics are used; these imply that the eventual choice of equilibrium dopends
on the starting point. In the stochastic analysis of choice of location and
technique by Arthur (1986) it is presumed that successive arrivals on the
scene decide where to locate on the basis of the choices of previous arrivals:
thus history, as embodied in the (random) sequence of arrivals, determines the
ultimate outcome. In Krugman (1981) the dynamics of capital accumulation
insure that a region that starts with a slightly larger capital stock
4eventually ends up with a dominant industrial position, while in Krugaan
(1987) a trade model with learning is specified in such a way that any
existing pattern of comparative advantage is reinforced over time, so that the
current state of the economy determines its future.
The central role of history in determining which of several long-run
equilibria emerges seems intuitive, and one would expect some role for history
to emerge in most reasonable models. Yet the dynamics that underlie
history-based models --dynamicsthat are, at base, Marshallian --aread hoc.
And there is a crucial problem with this ad hockery that calls the role of
initial conditions at least partly into question. Marshall assumed that
resources move gradually in response to differences in current earnings.
However, if resources move only gradually, it must be because it is costly for
them to move. And if it is costly to move, then owners of resources will be
interested not only in the current return on those resources but on expected
returns in the future. In the presence of some kind of externality, however,
future returns depend on the factor allocation decisions of other people --
whichalso depend on their expectations of future earnings. Thus there is at
least potentially a possibility of self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps if
everyone thinks that the economy will end up in equilibrium 1, then it will;
but if they believed instead that it would end up in equilibrium 2, that wauld
happen instead. In this case expectations rather than history play the
decisive role.
5The classic expectations-cum-aultiple equilibria story in the traditional
literature is the "Big Push" doctrine of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). In this
story the willingness of firms to invest depends on their expectation that
other firms will invest, so that the task of development policy is to create
convergent expectations around high investment. A clean formalizacion of this
story has been set forth by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988); in this
formalization the externality comes from the interaction of increasing returna
and market-size effects. The result is a case of multiple equilibria in which
the outcome is entirely a matter of self-fulfilling prophecy.
Expectation-driven multiple equilibria have also made their appearance in
both industrial organization and macroeconomics. In industrial organization
they arise in the context of adoption of a new technology, where network
externalities mean that the individual desirability of adoption depends on
what others do. Thus Fare].]. and Saloner (1986), in a model of technology
adoption,find that for some parameter valuesthere are multiple
equilibria, each of which could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. In
macroeconomics, expectations-driven multiple equilibria have received the
greatest attention in models of economies with search, including Diamond and
Fudenberg (1987) and Howitt and McAfee (1988) ,wherethe desirability of
participating in market activity depends on the likelihood of making tradea.
which in turn depends on how many others choose to participate.
The distinction between history and expectations as determinants of the
6eventual outcome is an important one. Both a world in which history matters
and a world of self-fulfilling expectations are different from the standard
competitive view of the world, but they are also significantly different from
each other. Obviously, also, there must be cases in which both are relevant.
Yet in the recent theoretical literature models have tended to be structured
in such a way that either history or expectations matters, but not both. To
take two examples: In Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1987), which is a fully
specified model, there is simply no room for history. On the other hand, in
Krugman (1987), which is a little less careful about the intertemporal aspect
but could be made more so, there is no room for expectations. Yet in the real
world, we would expect there to be circumstances in which initial conditions
determine the outcome, and others in which expectations may 1e decisive. But
what are these circumstances?
Our next step is clearly to develop a dynamic economic model in which
both history and expectations could matter, so that we can explicitly look at
their respective roles.
2. A simple model with multiple equilibria
There are many externality models with multiple equilibria; it does not
matter too much which we choose to examine. For the purposes of this paper I
will choose a model that is well-known in the international trade literature.
7that of a nation engaging in trade that has external economies in one sector.
This model is convenient because in its static version it is the subject of a
long tradition, including Graham (1923), Metthews(1949), Chacoliades (1978),
and Ethier (l982a); thus the surprising dynamic results reported below cannot
be attributed to any exoticism of the underlying model. It should be appatent
as we proceed, however, that similar results would obtain in a model of choice
of location, aa analyzed by Arthur (1986), in a model of choice of technology,
as discussed by David (1985), or in any of a variety of external economy
settings. Indeed, the results are very similar to (but much simpler than)
thoae obtained in the analysis of search equilibrium by Diamond and Fudenberg
(1987)
We consider, then, a one-factor economy. This economy ia able to produce
two goods: C, a good produced with constant returns, and X, a good whose
production is subject to an externality. Specifically, we assume that the
larger the labor force engaged in X production, the higher is labor
productivity in that sector:
It= Lx) (1)
This economy is assumed to be able to sell, both C and X at fixed prices
8on world markets1. By choosing units of goods and labor, we can normalize so
that one unit of labor produces one unit of C, and the value of that unit is
one. So the wage rate in the C sector is unity.
In the X sector, productivity depends on industry employment. Since the
economies of scale are external, however, each firm treats labor productivity
as constant, and the wage rate must therefore equal the average product:
=
lr(Lx)
Given the normalization, w is the wage rate in X relative to that in C.
To make life interesting, we assume ir(O)<l and ir(L)>l, where Listhe
economy's total labor supply. That is, the wage rate in the X-sector would be
lower than in the C-sector if nobody were employed in X, but would be higher
if everyone were employed there.
The existence of multiple equilibria is apparent. If nobody is employed
Much of the literature on this model is concerned with the two-country
equilibrium when neither country is small; it is well understood that the
extreme specialization T derive here need not happen when world prices are
endogenous. However, the dynamic analysis would of course be hatder in the
two-country case, so T restrict myself to small-country analysis here.
9in X, a worker considering producing X would find that she would receive a
lower wage than she receives producing C; so there is an equilibrium in which
the economy is specialized in the production of C. On the other hand, if
everyone is employed in the X sector, a worker considering producing C would
find that this would involve a wage cut; so specialization in X is also an
equilibrium.
Which equilibrium does the economy go to? In expositions of this kind of
model, one often appeals to a quasi-dynamic story of the kind illustrated in
Figure 1. The figure shows on its horizontal axis the quantity of labor
employed in the X sector, which can range between 0 and L, while on its
vertical axis it shows the relative wage w. We suppose that the economy starts
with some initial allocation of labor between the two sectors, and that labor
moves toward the sector that offer the higher wage. The result is illustrated
by the arrows. If the labor force in X is initially larger than the level
at which w—l, then the X sector will snowball until the economy is specialized
in X; if it is initially smaller than i4, the X sector will unravel and the
economy will specialize in C. Thus history, which determines the initial
conditions, determines the ultimate outcome.
This is not a bad story, as a first cut. Indeed, the usefulness of this
kind of heuristic approach to dynamics for thinking about models is so great
10that I would not propose abandoning it2. It should he apptent, however that
there are problems with using it here. Essentially the question is why labor
should adjust slowly. Suppose first that labor can in fact move costlessly
between the X and C sectors. Then in that case there is no reason why the
initial distribution of labor should matter. Whatever the initial position.
all workers will move to the sector that they expect to yield the higher wage
-- whichis the sector that they expect all the other workers to move to. Thus
in the absence of some cost of shifting labor either equilibrium can be
obtained as a self-fulfilling prophecy, whatever the initial position.
To make the initial position matter, then, it is necessary to introduce
some cost of adjustment in shifting labor between sectors. As soon as we do
this, however, the decision of a worker to shift from C to X or vice versa
becomes an investment decision, which depends not only on the current wage
differential but on expected future wage rates as well. But these future
wage rates depend depend on the decisions of other workers; if everyone
expects many workers to move from C to X over time, this will increase the
attractiveness of moving from C to X even if there is no immediate effect on
2See, for example, the use of Mmrshsllian stability analysis by Neary (iPTSa),
where s number of previously confused issues are neatly disposed of uaing this
device.
11relative wage rates. In other words, one cannot have dynamics without
expectations --andonce one has expectations playing a tole, there is in this
kind of model the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecy.
Does this mean that the traditional view that history is crucial for
determining equilibrium is completely wrong? Is it always possible to toach
either equilibrium if everyone expects it? The answer is no --butto see this
it is necessary to formulate the dynamics of the model explicitly.
3. Making the dynamic3
3This dynsmization of the externaleconomy model is closely related to the
dynamic model developed by Metsuyama (1988); in particular, the surprising
dynamics illustrated in Figure 3 were first noted by Matauysma in the context
of his model. There are some technical differences: his model derives its
dynamics from an overlapping-generations framework in which there is an
intertemporml distortion as well as an externality. However, the main
difference here is in the questions asked. A subsequent extension (Matsuyoma
1989), written subsequent to presentation of a first draft of this paper.
spproaches the same questions asked here in the context of a more general
model and with more elaborate techniques.
12To make the model explicitly dynamic, I follow Mussa (1978) by making the
cost of shifting labor a function of the rate at which labor is moved between
sectors. The simplest and most convenient functional form for this 'moving
cost" is quadratic; thus I assume that the national income of the economy at a




where -y is an inverse index of the cost of adjustment (so thatwill turn out
to be a measure of the speed of adjustment).
We suppose that individuals are able to borrow or lend freely on world
markets at a given world interest rate r. Thus their objective is to maximize
the present value of output,
H JYertdt
If the economy were run by a social planner who could internalize the
increasing returns to scale present in X production, she would maximize (4)
taking account of the dependence of productivity on the allocation of
resources. Since the economy actually consists of individuals who do not
internalize the externality, however, they take itasgiven at each point in
time. The market outcome may most easily be described as follows: labor moves
13at a rate determined by the equality of rsarginaL moving costs and a shadow
price that represents the difference in private value between having a unit of
labor in the X sector and in the Y sector:
(5)
where q is the shadow price placed on the "asset" of having a unit of labor in
the X rather than the C sector, defined as
q(t) =5 (al)ert)dr (6)
Therate of return on this "asset" must equal r:
rq =(ir-l)+q
where ir-l is the difference in current earnings between labor in the X and C
sectors, and q is the rate of capital gains on the shadow aaset. Equation (7)
may be rearranged to give a dynamic equation for q:
q =rq
-ir(L)+1
Equations (5) and (8) define a dynamic systea in L,q space. The
14qualitative laws of motion of this system are shown by the small arrows in
Figure 2. Whenever q is positive, Lx is rising; whenever it is negative L is
falling. The upward-sloping line q—O shows points where q equals the
capitalized value of a constant wage differential at the current rate. A
higher value of q can result only if q is expected to rise, a lower value only
if q is expected to fall. These lines cross at q—O, Lx=Lx
There are, of course, two possible long run equilibria of this model. At
one, illustrated by Ec the economy specializes completely in the production
of C; at the other, 5x' the economy specializes in x. At each equilibrium q
equals the present value of the difference between what workers actually earn
and what an individual worker would earn if she decided to produce the other
good indefinitely.
We now ask what paths can lead to these equilibria, consistent with the
laws of motion. Given the Qualitative laws of motion shown in Figure 2, it is
clearly possible to draw paths leading to the two equilibria that form the
S-shaped locus shown in the figure. The right half of the S represents a
path that leads to 5x' the left half a path that leads to
If the paths to the two equilibria did in fact look like those in Figure
2, the dynamic behavior of the model would be cleat. Suppose we are given an
initial allocation of labor between the two sectors. Then the initial value of
q must be set at the unique value that puts the economy on the S-shaped cutve.
From that point on the economy would simply obey the dynamics, convetging to
15one or the other long run equilibrium. If LX>LX initially, then the economy
would gradually move to E; if L{L; initially, the economy would gradually
converge to Bc• Thus the dynamics illustrated in Figure 2 confirm the ad hoc
dynamic analysis that is commonly used to think about these models, and that
was illustrated in Figure 1: resources move gradually toward whichever aector
offers the higher current wage rate. Adding en explicit description of the
decision to reallocate resources and of the implied role of expectations does
not change much.
The paths shown in Figure 2 are not, however, the only possible onea
consistent with the qualitative laws of motion. Inspecting the figure again.
we see that instead of a monotonic approach to each long run equilibrium, the
economy might follow a spiral. This leads to the artistically remarkable
Figure 3: the equilibrium paths consist of two interlocking spirals that wind
outward from the center of the figure and eventually separate to head for the
two long-run equilibria. A look at the figure will confirm that these paths do
indeed obey the laws of motion indicated by the small arrows. We may also
confirm that the two spirals never cross one another simply by observing that
there is a unique path from any point; since the two paths end up in different
places, thay must not have any points in common.
Before turning to the economic interpretation of Figure 3, we had better
confirm that both Figure 2 and Figure 3 are possible descriptions of
equilibrium paths, and find out under what circumstances each description
16prevails.
4. S-curve vs. spirals
At this point it is necessary to place some more structure on the model.
The simplest structure is a linear one: we suppose that the function ir(L)
takes the particular form
—1+fi(L-L)
The system defined by (5) and (8) then constitutes a pair of linear
differential equations.
A useful way to think about the paths shown in Figures 2 and 3 ia to
define t—O as the time when the economy reaches either one of the long run
equilibria. The possible paths to these equilibria are then traced out by
working backwards in time.
The roots of the system defined by (5) and (8) are
p {r (r2 -4fi)'2]/2
Thus there are two qualitative cases. If r2>4y, then there are two reai
positive roots. Then the system is unstable and must steadily diverge from
17q=O, Lx L. (Alternatively, if we run backwards in time the system is stable
and converges steadily to q=O, Lx =Lx)
On the other hand, if r2<43y there
are two complex roots with positive real parts. The system is unstable, but
diverges from the center in expanding oscillations. (Running backwards in
time, we trace out a path that converges in damped oscillations).
These two cases correspond to the pictures we have drawn in Figures 2 and
3. If the roots are real, the possible paths to the equilibria form the simple
S-curve in Figure 2; if they are complex, they form the interlocking spirals
of Figure 34
What is the economic meaning of the case illustrated in Figure 3? First
of all, we note that the spirals define a range of values of Lx from 4to
4,fromwhich either long-run equilibrium can be reached. Which one is
41t may at first appear that there could be paths that diverge from the
unstable equilibrium and reach one or the other steady state after a finite
number of oscillations; this would eliminate the correspondence between
existence of the overlap defined below and complex roots. However, in a linear
model such paths can be ruled out. One way to see this is to note that with
real roots there can be at most one reversal of the direction of motion of
each variable, and any paths more complicated than those drawn in Figure 2
would violate this if extended beyond the steady state.
18reached depends on expectations --thatis, for any initial position in that
range rhere exists at least one set of self-fulfilling expectations leading to
either long run outcome.In particular, there are the simple paths defined by
the outer arms of the two spirals that lead most rapidly to either long run
position. So the case of complex roots, which correponds to Figure 3, is al.so
the case in which over some range expectations rather than history are
decisive. It may be useful to have a shorthand way of referting to the range
of Lx from which either equilibrium can be reached; I will refer to it as the
overlao.
The surprising aspect of the results is that inside the overlap there may
be more than one act of expectations that leads to each equilibrium. If people
expect a direct path to Ey that will happen; but for some values of there
are also self-fulfilling cyclical paths. Indeed, as Lx gets close to Lx there
get to be an infinite number of possible paths in each direction. Thus the
possible dynamics are surprisingly complex.
It may be useful to offer an intuition behind these cyclical paths.
Imagine a slightly different model, in which there is a small constant coat of
adjustment and time is divided into discrete periods. Now suppose we propose
an equilibrium in which all labor alternately is employed in the x sector and
in the C sector. Can this pointless oscillation be an equilibrium? On
reflection it should be apparent that as long as adjustment coats are low
enough it can. Everyone wants to work in the same sector ma everyone else; if
19they blieve that everyone else will switch sectors in alternate periods, they
will do the same, validating these beliefs. The cyclical paths shown if Figure
3reflect a similar kind of pointless but nonetheless potentially
self-validating oscilletion.
The possibility of cyclical paths should not be overemphasized, however,
because in fact the possible dynamics within the range of the overlap are even
more complex than Figure 3 suggests. The reason is the possibility of random
jumps to the convergent paths. Once we have several possible determiuistic
paths, there is no resson to rule out stochastic paths that jump to one or
another of the deterministic paths with some possibly time-varying
probability. For example, consider the following example: suppose that
* initiallyLX<LX and q=O. Since the current wage rate is higher in the C
sector when LX<LX on a deterministic path we would have to have q rising at
that point. However, we can instead postulate a stochastic equilibrium in
which there is a constant probability that q will suddenly jump up to the
upper arm of the spiral leading to Exi with this probability exactly high
enough to yield an expected rate of change of q that compensates for the lower
wage. The result is then that Lx reamins constant until at some random instant
it suddenly begins to rise. The economic interpretstion is that wages are
higher in the C sector, but that labor does not move into that sector becauae
everyone expects that at some uncertain future date everyone else will start
moving into production of X. Even though there is no particular reascn to
20believe this, for any Lx in the relevant range there is a consistent set of
beliefs that will yield this result. A large number of such stochastic stories
can be constructed; most of them seem fairly silly, but there is nothing in
the model per se to rule them out.
In general, then, many things can happen if there is an overlap and the
initial position of the economy is inside it. About all that we can usefully
say is that when there is an overlap the economy must eventually go to one
equilibrium or the other, but that aelf-fulfilling expectations can lead it in
either direction5.
What is clear from the analysis, however, is that the basic question of
the respective roles of history and expectations reaolves itself in thie aodil
into the question of the overlap: doea an overlap exiat, and how wide is it?
5. Existence and size of the overlap
51t would be appealing to assume that the economy must follow the ehorteet
route to whichever equilibrium it eventually reachea, which would mean that
only the outer parts of the spirals would be relevant. Unfortunately, there
does not seem to be anything compelling in the economics to require this. One
may conjecture, however, that there is a maximum length of time taken to rearh
equilibrium, which dependa on how close Lx is to L.
21If there is no overlap, then history is always decisive in this model. If
there is an overlap, history determines the outcome if L lies outside the
overlap, but expectations decide the outcome if Lx lies inside. So we
must be interested in the factors determining the existence and width of the
overhang.
Fortunately, the existence of an overlap depends on only three
parameters: the interest rate r, flwhichrepresents the strength of the
external economies, and -y, which measures speed of adjustment. An overlap
exists if and only if r2<4fl.
What we see immediately is that there will be no overlap, and history
will dominate expectations, if r is sufficiently large. This makes sense: if
the future is heavily discounted, individuals will not care much about the
future actions of 5ther individuals, and this will eliminate the possibility
of self-fulfilling prophecies. We also see that a small fieliminatesrhe
possibility of self-fulfilling expectations, because if external economies are
small there will not be enough interdependence among decisions. Finally, and
perhaps most interestingly, if -y is small, so that the economy adjusts slawly,
then history is always decisive. The logic here is that if adjustment is slow,
factor rewards will be near current levels for a long time whatever the
expectations, so that factor reallocation always follows current returns.
We might also expect that the same factors will determine the width of
22the overlap. Determining the width of the overlap explicitly, even in the
linear case, is an algebraic nightmare, but the effect of -y on the width of
the overlap may be demonstrated using s simple geometric argument. In Figure
4, we show the outermost part of a spiral converging to 5x• The point A on
this spiral where it crosses q=O determines the lower boundary of the overlap.
Now suppose that we were to increase -y. This would leave equation (8)
determining the rate of change of q, unchanged for any given Lx and q.
However, at any positive q the rate st which Lx riaes would be increased. So a
path starting at point A would start to diverge to the right of the original
path leading to snd would do so increasingly over time. Clearly, in order
to reach Ex with a higher -y we would have to start somewhere further to the
left, say at A' .Thiswould then mean that the range of Ly from which it is
possible to reach Ex would be wider. A corresponding argument will show that
the upper boundary of the overlap will also be increased.
This should not be surprising. We noted at the beginning of this paper
that in the absence of adjustment costs history is irrelevant: any equiiibriuc
can be reached through convergent expectations. We now see that the slower the
rate at which the economy adjusts, the more likely it is that history aatters:
if adjustment is slow enough, history is always derisive.
Figure 5 shows the results of explicit calculation of the overlap for a
particular numerical example. In this example, Lx 0.5, jS=l, r =.1.The
width of the overlap is then calculated for various values of -y. Note that at
23= .0025the overlap would disappear, while at sufficiently high levela of
the overlap would expand to fill the entire space, eliminating any role for
history.
6. Conclusions
This paper has used a simple model to try to shed some light on a deep
subject. As economists grow more willing to make use of models in which there
are important multiple equilibria, they will have to take a position on what
determines the choice of equilibrium. Most economists who have thought about
it at all have assumed that history dictates the choice; but there is a
counter-tradition, significantly represented in recent work, that emphasizes
self-fulfilling expectations instead. There is not to my knowledge any
systematic discussion of when which view is right.
What this paper has shown in the context of a simple model is that the
relative importance of history and expectations depends on the underlying
structure of the economy --inparticular, on the costs of adjustment. The
insights gained from this analysis look as though they may be capable of
considerable generalization. The methods also yield some surprising and
interesting results. It is to be hoped that as the study of models with
increasing returns continues to grow more important, the insights and method
presented here will turn out to be useful.
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